Why We are Good and They are Bad : A Look at Identity and Otherization in American and Japanese Films of World War Two by デラ リチャード & Richard H. Derrah
Why We are Good and They are Bad:
A Look at Identity and Otherization in 
American and Japanese Films of World War Two 
????????
Richard H. Derrah
This paper examines the wartime policies of the United States and Japan during the 
Second World War in relation to propaganda.  The policies followed by each country 
included the use of various types of media for propaganda often containing similar 
messages on both sides of the confl ict such as vilifi cation of the enemy or the need to 
conserve.  In the use of fi lm, however, both countries differed.  This paper will detail 
the differences between American and Japanese war fi lms and the reasons for these 
differences.
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Introduction
Mobilization for total war by so many nations 
across the globe is one of the dist inguishing 
characteristics of the Second World War.  This 
mobilization extended into all parts of the economy 
and culture of the nations involved.  It extended into 
the media as well with nations using propaganda 
via a variety of mediums.  The goal of propaganda 
often falls into three categories.  The fi rst describes 
a national rally cry for the war such as Pearl Harbor 
for the United States or the details of the A-B-C-D 
line for the Japanese.  This was often a statement 
of why the country had no other option but to go to 
war.  The second category is a confi rmation that the 
subject nation is on the side of good.  It tells people 
what they are fi ghting to defend.  The third category 
is the mirror image of the second describing how 
the enemy is bad, evil, corrupt, etc. and why they 
will eventually be defeated as long as people band 
together and sacrifi ce for the good of the nation.  The 
total mobilization of the media during the Second 
World War saw these three categories used across a 
wide range of media including posters, leafl ets, plays, 
radio broadcasts, speeches, photographs, newspapers, 
and music.  One media form in particular goes 
against this trend of various messages and instead 
focused predominately on one message over the 
others.  Movies produced by the United States and 
Japan during the Second World War both focus on 
one element out of the three described above to the 
exclusion of the others.  
War fi lms produced by both the United States and 
Japan during the Second World War were different 
from other types of media in their presentation of 
both the nation and the enemy.  In general, U.S. 
war fi lms placed an emphasis on dehumanizing 
the enemy in contrast to Japanese war fi lms which 
almost neglected the portrayal of the enemy and, in 
stead, focused on describing national identity.  This 
is unique to fi lm.  In other forms of propaganda both 
the United States and Japan have propaganda which 
fall into the three categories described above.  How 
do the war fi lms of the United States and Japan 
compare with other forms of propaganda produced 
during the war?  Is the message of the fi lm dependant 
on the intended audience?  Why do these fi lms 
generally focus on one theme over the other and why 
that particular theme?
Propaganda
War propaganda must be adapted to the actual 
conditions in the enemy country and to the 
current attitudes and specifi c susceptibilities 
of the enemy audience.  This adaptation is 
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particularly diffi cult in war propaganda for 
two reasons.  First, contact with the listening 
audience is almost completely cut off so that 
there is no way to know accurately the conditions 
in the enemy country which constitute the 
other parts of the total situation.  Second, the 
propagandist is generally dealing with peoples of 
another nation, with different culture, language, 
and national traditions which are often but 
imperfectly understood by foreign `experts .` 
(Berreman, pg.108)  
Japan used a va r iety of media to spread 
propaganda in target countries with varying degrees 
of success.  A large focus was placed on occupied 
countries as these allowed the greatest access and use 
of various methods of distribution.  Attempts were 
made to vary the message based on the conditions 
within the country.  Due to physical constraints, 
propaganda distribution against the United States 
was limited.  
One method of using propaganda directly 
against the United States came in the form of radio 
broadcasts.  While Japanese radio propaganda 
directed against the United States may be considered 
to be not commonly well known, however, one only 
needs to mention Tokyo Rose to dispel this belief. 
Generally these radio broadcasts used English to 
address what was considered to be several weak 
points which could be exploited to weaken moral and 
the U.S. war effort in general.  A large component 
of these broadcasts contrasted stated U.S. war aims 
with current conditions within the United States. 
Addressing the Atlantic Charter and other statements 
about democracy, Japan countered by describing 
social conditions within the United States.   
Nippon stresses the Americans contempt for 
nonwhites, their scorn of colored peoples, and 
their mistreatment of Negroes within their midst. 
After citing examples of Negro restrictions, 
discriminations, and Jim Crow laws, the Japanese 
commentator asked a most embar rassing 
questing: If these limited rights exist in the 
America, how can Mr. Roosevelt promise them 
sincerely to the whole world?  How can America 
be fi ghting for them?  (Padover, pg.197) 
The ef fect iveness of  t h is  propaganda is  
questionable.  While Japanese propaganda did make 
some valid points concerning racial discrimination 
and overall war goals, it was lacking.  In Berreman’s 
article, Assumptions about America in Japanese War 
Propaganda to the United States, on page 113 in a 
footnote he states that he worked in the Offi ce of 
Facts and Figures in 1942 when that offi ce conducted 
numerous moral studies showing almost completely 
that the American public did not consider a Japanese 
victory in the war a possibility.  
In occupied countries such as the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Burma, and China, Japan had greater 
access and could thus use a wide variety of methods 
to distribute propaganda.  The goal of the propaganda 
was varied and often individualized based upon 
the conditions in the target country.  In general, 
however, there are several common elements. 
Efforts were put forth to make Japanese the primary 
language of many occupied countries with local 
languages considered secondary but still offi cial 
languages.  Western languages such as English and 
Dutch became illegal.  Music was utilized to spread 
propaganda and access to American or British music 
was forbidden.  Radio Tokyo stated “The eradication 
of American and British music is our most pressing 
duty at the moment.” (Berreman, Japanization, 
pg.170 )  Educat ion ,  yout h g roups ,  pol it ica l  
organizations were all used as tools of propaganda.  
Propaganda in the Philippines generally focused 
on rallying the Pilipino people behind the Japanese 
cause.  Descriptions of the enemy described how 
they were occupiers while the Japanese were 
liberators.  The Japanese were freeing Asia from 
western infl uence and giving Asia back to Asians. 
In December of 1941, planes dropped leafl ets into 
Manila before the arrival of Japanese army.
The best sections of manila, as you all know, 
have been seized by Americans and they own the 
best clubs, the best stores, and the best residences 
in utter disregard of your rights.  You are scorned 
in public and made fun of in their exclusive clubs 
where you are not allowed admittance.  (Padover, 
pg 199)
As in the United States radio broadcast were 
used in the Philippines and in one broadcast from 
occupied Manila the link between education and 
propaganda was clearly stated.  
Part of the task of Philippine education is to 
make the people understand they must cooperate 
with Japan, must subscribe to the Japanese 
language, need to learn more about the Japanese 
and gain from their knowledge of art, social 
breeding, science, and determination.  The 
Imperial policy . . . must be the starting point of 
education. (Berreman, Japanization, pg.171)
The goal was focused on bringing the occupied 
people into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.  Freedom f rom western powers was 
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promised, but at a cost.  The Philippines was not the 
only country to pay this cost.
Propaganda in Burma and Malaysia had many 
similarities to propaganda in the Philippines. 
Promises made to the Burmese and Malaysian people 
were the same as promises made in the Philippines 
and elsewhere.  The propaganda effort emphasized 
the shared background between the occupied people 
and Japan and stressed a common future.
If Burma cooperates with Japan, she will 
realize her age-long desire for independence. 
As Burmese people are of Asiatic race and are 
Buddhists, as are the Japanese, it is only natural 
that every Burmese cooperate with Japan.  Those 
who resist will be looked upon as an enemy of 
East Asia.  (Padover, pg. 200)
It stressed a common enemy as propaganda in 
the Philippines did.
A deep-rooted hatred that you Malayans shall 
hold against your British offi cers and men is 
rightfully shared by the Japanese Army. . . . Men 
who have been oppressed, exploited and driven 
into submission are not enemies of Japan.  In 
fact, you Malayans should be fi ghting shoulder 
to shoulder with us against our common enemy. 
(Padover, pg.201)
It also stressed the importance of education for 
propaganda purposes.  One Japanese offi cial wrote 
the following statement after returning from Burma:
At present in Burma the establishment of the new 
education is progressing steadily day by day.  The 
date is not far distant when the Burmans who are 
to undertake the responsibility of the new East 
Asia will be completely molded according to its 
pattern.  (Berreman, Japanization, pg. 171)
Was this propaganda effective?  In June, 1943, 
Burma’s Minister of Education U. B. Lwin, made the 
following statement while visiting Japan:
We have no doubt about the integrity of the 
Co-Prosperity policy, Asia for the Asiatics, 
and we are an integral part of Asia.  We are 
Orientals, and the Japanese are also of the 
Orient.  As Orientals, we are proud to see the 
Japanese achieving victories unprecedented in 
history.  Therefore, we in Burma should do our 
best for the ultimate victory of Japan in this war. 
(Padover, pg. 200)
In general, propaganda in the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Burma tried to create a common 
background between the occupied people and Japan. 
There was less emphasis on the dehumanization of 
the enemy probably because all of these countries 
had fi rst hand knowledge of the intended targets.  A 
much safer course was to exploit the inequalities 
in the social systems placed by the former colonial 
powers.  These generalities did not apply in one 
country that Japan, at least partially, occupied, 
China.
Japanese propaganda in China did utilize the 
common background appeal used in the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Burma, however, this was only a small 
part of the effort.  Propaganda efforts concerning 
China were directed towards three primary groups, 
the Chinese population, foreigners in China, and 
Japanese citizens at home.  The primary goal 
intended for the Chinese population was cooperation 
while the objective for the foreign community 
living in China was neutrality.  Finally propaganda 
efforts relating to China for the home islands was 
intended to gather positive support for operations in 
China.  In order to achieve these goals propaganda 
tactics varied, but favorite targets included leaders 
of the Nationalist Chinese government and the 
communists.  This differed sharply with propaganda 
efforts in other countries.  Very negative images 
vastly outnumbered statements about the shared 
background between China and Japan.  (Rowe, 
pg 571-572) Leafl ets and posters played a large 
part in propaganda activities in China.  As the war 
progressed and widened, the Japanese fi lm industry 
played a larger part in propaganda operations, 
however, focusing on a different theme than some 
other forms of propaganda.
Japanese War Films
Japanese fi lm industry along with other parts 
of the economy mobilized for war.  In contrast to 
the various messages distributed in other types of 
media, in the fi lm industry, the message was clearly 
to reinforce a strong sense of national identity.  In 
order to produce fi lms to carry this message during 
a time of national shortages the government became 
directly involved in the fi lm industry.
The ten major fi lm companies then operating 
(Nikkatsu, Shochiku, Toho, Shinko, Daito, 
Tokyo Hassei, Nan-o, Takarazuka, Otaguro, and 
Koa) were told that they had to form themselves 
into two companies, and that each company was 
to make two fi lms a month.  Raw stock would 
not be made available unless the studios made 
the kind of pictures the state required.  (Richie, 
pg.97)
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As the movie companies were restructured to 
produce fi lms more effi ciently for the war effort, the 
movie industry focused not on dehumanizing the 
enemy as seen in so many American wartime fi lms, 
but instead focused on reinforcing a sense of national 
identity.
The 47 Ronin directed by Kenji Mizuguchi was 
not a fi lm with a story based on the war, but a fi lm 
about the Chushingura incident during the Edo 
Period.  The government asked Mizuguchi to make 
a fi lm for the war effort and he decided on this story 
which is very well known.  In his version, however, 
some of the most famous scenes occur off camera. 
The fi lm is supposed to reinforce the concept of 
bushido and rally the nation, but even in the end of 
the fi lm when the 47 samurai commit suicide the 
audience is not allowed to see this.  The only suicide 
shown is by a female character.
Akira Kurosawa’s The Men Who Tread on the 
Tiger’s Tail produced in 1945 is another wartime 
fi lm based on a very well known story from Japanese 
history.  It is the story of Yoshitsune and his small 
band of followers including the warrior-monk 
Benkei as they escape from Yoshitsune’s brother who 
has ordered Yoshitsune killed after the end of the 
Gempei War.  The story has been told as a kabuki 
play and as a Noh drama even earlier.  When the fi lm 
was complete the wartime censors banned the fi lm 
stating that the characters were too individualistic. 
This was a trait of the West and opposed to the 
national identity the government wanted to portray. 
After the war the U.S. occupation censors reviewed 
the fi lm and decided it looked to favorably on Japan’s 
militaristic past and banned the fi lm.  The fi lm was 
not released until after the occupation ended.  
Another fi lm by Akira Kurosawa  The Most 
Beautiful (1944) is set in an optical factory during 
the war.  There is no image of the enemy, but the war 
is ever present.  A group of girls work and live at the 
factory producing optical lenses for the army.  The 
story shows the girls struggling and working hard 
together as their quotas are increased.  
Good production is dependent on good character, 
and the fi lm demonstrates in anecdotal fashion 
what this good fashion is.  The women fall ill, 
sustain physical injury, and even lose family 
members, but never waiver in their commitment 
to the factory and their quotas.  (Prince. pg. 55)
There is no sign of the evil nature of the enemy 
or discussion of why Japan is on the side of good. 
The fi lm shows the sacrifi ces of these individuals for 
the good of the nation.  There is no equivalent fi lm 
produced by the United States which stresses solely 
identity during the war.
In 1940 the movie Shina no Yoru was released. 
It starred Yamaguchi Yoshiko who was also known 
by her Chinese name Li Hsiang-lan, the Chinese 
pronunciation of her Japanese name Ri Ko-ran, and 
by Shirley Yamaguchi during the occupation.  It was 
the story of a young Japanese merchant sailor who 
was working in Shanghai during the war.  He meets 
a young Chinese girl played by Yamaguchi and they 
fall in love.  The most interesting aspect of this fi lm is 
that it was fi lmed with three different endings.  Each 
ending was made with a specifi c audience in mind. 
In one ending the hero is killed by Chinese bandits 
after the couple gets married.  Upset by the loss of 
her new husband, the young wife kills herself.  This 
ending was shown to audiences in the Japanese home 
islands.  In the second ending the fi nal scene is the 
wedding ceremony of the young couple.  This ending 
was intended for Chinese audiences in Japanese 
occupied china.  In the third ending the young wife is 
about to kill herself because she believes her husband 
died, but he returns wounded just in time to stop her 
from killing herself.  This third ending was intended 
for other Japanese occupied areas outside of china.  
In the fi lm Chocolate and Soldiers produced 
in 1938, a young boy receives letters from his 
father who is fi ghting in China.  The father collects 
chocolate wrappers from his friends in the army and 
sends then back to his son.  Eventually the boy’s father 
is killed in action.  The chocolate company receives 
a letter describing the situation and it provides a 
scholarship for the boy so he is able to attend school. 
At the funeral for his father, the boy is told his father 
was a brave man and the boy replies “Yes, but I can’t 
go fi shing with him anymore.” (Dower, pg.37-38) 
The national identity is clearly being expressed. 
Things are diffi cult, but all must pull together.  There 
is no equivalent in American war fi lms.   
American War Films
The opening of the confl ict with the attack on 
Pearl Harbor set the stage for the description of 
the Japanese people as deceptive, uncivilized, and 
fanatic in various forms of media.  This was not lost 
on the fi lm industry.  “It was a rare fi lm that did not 
employ such terms as Japs, beasts, yellow monkeys, 
nips, or slant-eyed rats.” (Koppes, pg.254) Not just 
the use of racial terms, but a focus on depictions of 
the enemy were part of 107 movies released from 
1942-1944, accounting for almost 30% of Hollywood 
fi lm production.  (Jones pg4) In contrast to other 
types of propaganda during the war, American war 
fi lms focused almost exclusively on demonizing the 
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enemy.  The enemy is not only on the battlefi eld, but 
also in the local neighborhood.  Despite statements 
by the Department of Justice in the fall and winter 
of 1942-1943 indicated that in the united states 
no major acts of sabotage or espionage had been 
uncovered that were defi nitely trace able to enemy 
sources.  (Jones pg5) both movies and serials used 
this as a continuous theme.  In one serial entitled 
G-Men vs. The Black Dragon, a group of Japanese 
spies try to blow up the Boulder Dam.  
Bataan made in April, 1943 starring Robert 
Taylor was the story of a mixed group of soldiers 
defending against the attacking Japanese army in 
the Philippines.  Facing overwhelming odds these 
soldiers fought to the very last man.  There are two 
interesting points to note about this fi lm.  First there 
was an emphasis on the mixed nature of the soldiers 
fi ghting together.  Rich, poor, white, black, Latino, 
and Pilipino are all shown fi ghting side by side against 
a common enemy.  Second, this fi lm shows the main 
characteristic of American fi lm war heroes.  They 
kill lots and lots of the enemy.  Not breaking from 
the trend of World War Two fi lms, Bataan details 
the brutality and inhumanity of the enemy.  Japanese 
planes are seen attacking an ambulance and women 
and children are killed.
In 1945, Errol Flynn star red in the movie 
Objective Burma.  U.S. troops in Burma on a mission 
to destroy a radar installation.  The troops destroy 
the radar station, but are unable to get to an airfi eld 
for their withdrawal.  They are forced to march out of 
the jungle.  Splitting into two forces the fi lm follows 
the group led by Flynn.  While fi ghting the Japanese 
constantly during their retreat, the group enters a 
village and fi nds the second group.  The members 
have all been killed and their bodies mutilated.  A 
news correspondent who was Flynn’s group makes 
the following speech after the discovery:
   
I thought I’d seen or read about everything 
one man can do to another, from the torture 
chambers of the middle ages to the gang wars 
and lynchings of today.  But this- this is different. 
This was done in cold blood by people who claim 
to be civilized.  Civilized!  They’re degenerate, 
immoral idiots.  Stinking little savages.  Wipe 
them out, I say.  Wipe them off the face of the 
earth.  Wipe them off the face of the earth. 
(Bataan)
The speech was considered controversial by some 
people involved in the making of the fi lm, however, 
the only controversy to surface after the release of 
the fi lm was in Britain where some complained that 
there were no American troops fi ghting in Burma. 
The extreme racial element of the fi lm was not a 
problem.
In 1943 Universal Pictures produced the movie 
Gung-Ho.  It is the story of a group of Marines from 
their training in San Diego to a mission to attack 
Minkin Island.  
As in Objective Burma, this fi lm has numerous 
racia l comments.  “The fi lm is l it tered with 
references to J`aps`  and `monkeys who live in trees` . 
Several wounded Japanese fake death to try and kill 
unsuspecting Americans.” (Koppes, pg. 265) 
Amer ican war fi lms produced dur ing the 
Second World War did not exclusively focus on 
the demonization of the enemy, but it was the 
primary focus.  Some fi lms showed the home front 
and others such as Bataan introduced cooperation 
between different racial groups and allies, however, 
this was clearly a secondary goal.  It was even 
counter-productive in the case of Objective Burma, 
where the fi lm caused some controversy between the 
United States and its ally Britain.  This still leaves us 
with the question of why the focus on dehumanizing 
the enemy in American fi lms.
Conclusion
Propaganda activities reached new heights 
during the Second World War as countries across 
the globe mobilized all their resources for total war. 
Propaganda was one resource mobilized and it was 
applied to a variety of media to spread its message. 
Generally propaganda could be divided into three 
categories.  The fi rst describes a national rally cry for 
the war stating why the country had no other option 
but to go to war.  The second explains why god is on 
our side.  The third category tells us why the enemy 
is bad so it is okay to kill them.  Most propaganda 
during the war fell into these three categories 
and within each media, such as posters or radio 
broadcasts, elements of all three categories can be 
found, except for one media.  Film, both American 
and Japanese really focused on one element.  For the 
Japanese this was the reinforcement of a national 
identify.  Very little attention is paid to the evil 
enemy.  American fi lms stand in stark contrast as 
they focus heavily on describing the enemy as less 
than human.  The enemy is otherized into a less than 
human form of evil.  Why the focus and why the 
difference?
The answer lies in the nature of fi lm.  A movie 
requires more time, resources, and investment than 
a poster or even a song.  It is affordable to produce 
a poster on a subject that is part of a countries 
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propaganda agenda, but not its central goal.  This is 
not the case with fi lm.  For Japan the war involved 
protection of acquired natural resources and the 
cooperation of local populations to help exploit 
these resources.  The war was also more defensive 
in nature after the initial six months.  Reinforcing 
the national identity which Japan saw as its greatest 
strength and then exporting that identity to newly 
acquired populations within the empire was critical. 
Making a maximum effort to defi ne the enemy as 
less than human would be counter-productive to 
the best possible solution to the war with the United 
States and Britain − a negotiated settlement.
For the United States, a negotiated settlement was 
not the best outcome to the confl ict and it envisioned 
a long war of attack followed by attack across the 
expanse of the Pacifi c Ocean.   Providing the U.S. 
population with an image of an American national 
identity asking for acceptance of hardship would not 
encourage young men to storm islands in the Pacifi c. 
Combining the circumstances of the outbreak of the 
war at Pearl Harbor with national war aims clearly 
showed the best policy would be to dehumanize the 
enemy.
For the Japanese wartime cinema it was best to 
show why we are good and for the American fi lm 
industry it was best to tell why they are bad.    
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